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ABSTRACT
Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple agency conflicts, this paper
examines factors affecting the implementation of equity based incentive schemes in initial public
offerings (IPOs). Using a unique sample of UK IPO companies between years 1998 and 2002, it
shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with
share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained
ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional
incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the “toughness” of executive
compensation. The papers interesting findings suggests a number of avenues for a future analysis
of governance development process in “threshold” firms.
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Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings: The Effects of
Multiple Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance
INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of fast-growing firms face the decision to go public at different stages of
their life-cycle, and the process of Initial Public Offering (IPO) has had increasing attention from
academics (Jain & Kini, 1999; Ritter, 1987).  Predominantly research on IPO companies has
focused on areas such as issue performance (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998;
Mikkelson, Partch & Shah, 1997; Pham, Kalev & Steen, 2003), and its relationships with general
corporate governance parameters such as board structure and characteristics (Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Certo, Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Within these diverse
research streams, a relatively little attention has been given to the role of executive compensation
with regards to the IPO company. Although Beatty and Zajac (1994) argue the need for a more
unified perspective on the control of executive compensation in the IPO company, there is
37
                                                                                       little understanding among academics and
practitioners of factors affecting introduction of executive compensation schemes at the time of
IPO and their structural characteristics, such as their relation to various performance targets
established by the firm’s board and shareholders.
Financial economists and organization theorists have developed a substantial body of
literature on factors driving executive compensation and its organizational outcomes (see Conyon,
Peck, Read & Sadler, 2000, for an extensive literature review). Most of the executive
compensation studies have been rooted in labor economics and agency theory and have focused
predominantly on mature publicly listed companies.  Over recent years this has provided fuel for
commentators to criticize the remuneration received by top executive directors.  Many US studies
have explored possible links between executive pay and the performance of the company, but
these links have been found to be weak or non-existent (Berkema, Geroski & Schwalbach, 1997;
Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  Within the UK these links also have not been strong (Conyon & Leech,
1994; Gregg, Machin & Symanski, 1993; Main, Bruce & Buck, 1996). Some researchers argue
that the incorporation of share based incentive schemes can promote unethical reporting behavior
by CEOs (Carson, 2003).  This is particularly important as it is estimated that in the late 90’s
nearly 80% of the rise in CEO pay came from share options grants (Perel, 2003).  More recently,
research on compensation issues in the mature listed company has been widened to encompass
areas such as compensation and option incentives (Conyon & Sadler, 2001), the structure of
compensation contracts (Conyon et al., 2000) and governance issues such as board control and
remuneration committees (Conyon & Peck, 1998).  However, the structure and characteristics of
executive share-based compensation in the IPO company still remains unexplored, even though
IPOs represent a unique laboratory to study equity based incentive pay schemes such as executive
share options and long term incentive plans at a crucial time in the firm’s development, which is
often referred to as a “strategic threshold” (Filatotchev, Toms & Wright, 2006).
IPO context provides a number of opportunities for the development of more fine grained
analysis of various theoretical aspects associated with equity-based incentive schemes, such as
“risk-incentive trade-off” (Prendergast, 2002) or “framing” of risk preferences within behavioral
agency framework (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  As Betty & Zajac (1994:315) argue,
studying newer firms that are considering a wider variety of internal governance mechanisms may
provide a particularly clear test of the agency-based contingency perspectives. For example, the
question of choice between conditional (“hard”) and unconditional (“soft”) share option schemes
ultimately concerns the effects of “hard” or “soft” targets on risk-taking behavior, but traditional
agency-based corporate governance models are relatively silent on this issue (Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998:142).  Beatty & Zajac (1994) emphasize that, since IPO firms may be particularly
dependent on the existing top management team that usually includes the original founders, they
may be more sensitive to managerial preferences for minimizing risk-bearing than would larger
firms.
Furthermore, unlike large mature firms with diffused external shareholders, IPO firms
come to the stock market with more concentrated ownership patterns, with managers, founders
and early stage investors, such as venture capital firms (VCs) still retaining substantial equity
stakes after the flotation (Filatotchev, 2006).  A recent study by Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz &
Johnson (2008) argues that the IPO firms provide a multiple agency setting associated with
“conflicts of interest  among more than one agent group” (p. 277). Such settings create both a
potential for “conflicting voices” among various principal groups (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson &
Grossman, 2002), as well as agents’ “conflicting choices” concerning which principals’ interests
should have priority. For example, founders of the IPO firm, being large-block shareholders, may
be considered as principals to non-founding executive directors. At the same time, these founders
may also retain executive positions, which turns them into agents of external shareholders, such as
VCs. Likewise, VCs may be principals to the executive directors as well as agents to those who
provides funds. However, multiple agency research is silent with regard to how interests and risk
preferences of multiple principals/agents in the IPO firm influence governance-related decisions
such as the adoption of equity based incentive schemes.
            This paper extends previous work in several ways. First, we make a contribution to
corporate governance research by integrating multiple agency and behavioral agency theories and
suggesting that combining them may help to develop further agency-based models of executive
risk taking behavior and their attitudes towards different types of equity based incentives. Second,
we a develop further multiple agency framework by providing more fine grained analysis of the
governance roles of executive and non-executive founders who very often are in charge of critical
decision-making functions in entrepreneurial IPOs. The third contribution is that we show how
different incentives and risk preferences of key shareholder constituencies in the IPO firm may
impact on the choice between “soft” and “hard” equity-based incentive schemes. Our last
contribution is to the behavioral agency view of the board’s governance functions. By integrating
behavior and multiple agency perspectives, we argue that the specific board characteristics, such
as board independence and founders’ control over the board, may determine the “salience” of
multiple principals’ preferences, and, therefore, they should have a significant impact on the
“toughness” of executive remuneration schemes.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Beatty & Zajac (1994:315) argue that an IPO provides a unique opportunity to examine
compensation arrangements and governance relationships that become formalized when an
organization becomes an open corporation and its stock is openly traded for the first time.
Although an IPO leads to a significant amount of capital raised with the issue of shares, it is often
accompanied by the dilution of ownership from the existing shareholders to outside institutional
and retail investors.  Thus at the point of the IPO, founders and executives face both an exciting
growth period and an uncertain time as they place shares beyond their control into the open
market.  Agency theorists argue that governance structures should be put in place to re-align the
interests of insiders and outside shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pagano, Panetta &
Zingales, 1998; Pagano & Röell, 1998), and linking executives’ remuneration to conditional share
option schemes is often considered as powerful re-alignment mechanism.  However, selecting
equity-related incentive schemes may be problematic when there are different, perhaps conflicting
voices in an IPO because of the multiple agent interests associated with different shareholder
constituencies (Arthurs et al., 2008:282).  Therefore, the IPO firm’s governance parameters may
be an outcome of a complex pattern of principals’ interests and agents’ risk preferences associated
with distribution of ownership and control within the newly listed firm (Filatotchev, 2006).
Building on the multiple agency perspective of the IPO firm’s governance aspects (e.g.,
Arthurs et al., 2008; e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2006) and behavioral agency research (e.g., Westphal
& Zajac, 1995; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) this paper argues
that in the IPO firm’s decisions to implement equity-based incentive schemes and the extent of
their “toughness” are not exogenous factors. Rather, they are linked to the distribution of retained
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ownership among multiple principals/agents, as well as their control over the IPO firm’s board.
We differentiate between the governance roles of four main groups of shareholders - non-
founding executive directors, executive founders, non-executive founders, and venture capital
firms – and consider their interests and risk preferences. Building on the behavioral agency
research we argue that founding and non-founding executives should exhibit strong preferences
for unconditional share option schemes, since their retained ownership leads to loss-aversion (as
opposed to risk-aversion) within gain framed context (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  However, the interests and risk preferences of non-executive founders and
venture capitalists underpin a strong principal perspective on executive remuneration, and,
building on “risk-incentive tradeoff” research (e.g., Prendergast, 2002) we argue that, in the
uncertain environment of an IPO, these two groups of investors may support the development of
conditional, performance-related incentive schemes (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Finally, we argue
that the specific board characteristics, such as board independence and founders’ control over
board, may determine the “salience” of multiple principals’ preferences, and, therefore, they
should have a significant impact on the “toughness” of executive remuneration schemes. The
following sections develop these arguments further and suggest a number of testable hypotheses.
We start our analysis with corporate governance aspects of share ownership of hired, non-
founding directors. Then we consider dual agency roles of executive and non-executive founders
and early stage investors. Our theoretical discussion concludes with analysis of the impact of
board characteristics on the choice between conditional and unconditional share options in the
IPO firm.
Multiple agents, ownership structure and equity based incentive schemes
In their seminal article on corporate governance, Jensen & Meckling (1976)  indicate that the
flotation of a company’s shares on the public market leads to the ‘principal-agent’ concern: how
to reconcile the interests of incumbent managers and executive directors (as ‘agents’) with those
of the company’s ultimate owners – external shareholders (as ‘principals’).  Corporate governance
research suggests that appropriate mechanisms need to be put in place to motivate directors to
align their own interests more closely with the shareholders, thus ensuring goal congruence. Share
option based incentive schemes for executive directors have been discussed as the key way to help
overcome agency problems (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Murphy,
1985), with greater amounts of the managers’ compensation being tied directly to the performance
of the company (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  At the point of the IPO this becomes particularly
relevant, since a gradual process of “professionalization” of entrepreneurial ventures is usually
accompanied by an increasing importance of hired, non-founding executives (Daily & Dalton,
1992; Willard, Krueger & Feeser, 1992).  Indeed, some authors argue that one of the reasons for a
private company to go public is a possibility to introduce share-based incentive schemes for non-
founding key employees (Pagano & Röell, 1998).
Traditional agency argument that the implementation and use of compensation schemes
can potentially mitigate the mis-alignment of managerial incentives and associated agency
problems has been challenged by studies on the “incentive-risk trade-off” (Beatty & Zajac, 1994;
Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 2002). This research argues that linking a manager’s remuneration
too closely to firm performance could potentially lead to risk-avoiding behavior by the manager.
Whilst it can be argued that equity and performance based compensation can have desirable
motivational aspects, it may also cause the manager to have undesirable risk bearing
characteristics.  Rappaport (1981; 1999) argues that managers, who act as the agents of the
shareholders, are more risk averse than the owners of the company.  Unlike owners of the
company, who are able to diversify their ownership portfolio, managers have already invested
their non-diversifiable human capital in the firm (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia &
Balkin, 1992).  As Scholes (1992:123) argues, “managers are more likely to attach significantly
more value to a given level of cash than to the same expected level in stock or options because
they can use this cash to buy a diversified portfolio of common stock, bonds, or whatever”.
In terms of compensation issues the most significant part of risk bearing for the executive
is the acceptance of equity-based compensation within their compensation contract.  Any form of
equity-based pay will cause the executive to bear risk that could otherwise be more efficiently
borne by the shareholders who are able to diversify their investments.  As a consequence of this,
executives are more likely to have preference for cash payment than to share options (Jensen &
Murphy, 1990).  This shift in managerial preferences may be particularly dramatic when incentive
schemes are tied to “tough” measures linked to company performance such as earnings per share,
total shareholder return and market share prices (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  If company risk is high,
then any proportion of remuneration that is equity based will be further loaded not only with non-
diversifiable risk but also company risk.  As such the executives will face a very different level of
risk to the shareholder, and these risks can hinder the alignment of the two in the context of pay
schemes that link pay to performance (Gray & Cannella, 1997; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Both agency arguments and the “risk-incentives trade-off” framework imply that risk
preferences of managers may be contingent on the value of managers’ equity holdings.  From the
traditional agency perspective, the higher the managers’ equity position, the less severe the agency
incentive problem is, making it less likely that firms will need to use stock options in their
compensation contracts. Similarly, the risk – incentives research argues that high equity stakes in
the firm mean that managers are relatively less diversified, and stock-based incentives would lead
to their risk aversion. Both theories suggest that managerial ownership should be negatively
related to the probability of “hard” performance contracts, ceteris paribus (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).
However, in the context of an IPO, this argument may be contested bearing in mind
possible dilution of executive equity during the process of listing  (Baker & Gompers, 2003;
Certo, Daily, Cannella & Dalton, 2003), especially if dilution occurs when the original
shareholders partially “exit” by selling some of their equity in the IPO. Since dilution through the
sale of existing shares may increase the extent of diversification of the executives, multiple-
agency framework (Arthurs et al., 2008) suggests that this increase in diversification combined
with their retained equity in the focal company should bring non-founding executives in closer
alignment with other principals and change their risk preferences. As a result, executives may
want to obtain some upside gains associated with conditional share options, and, when controlled
for share dilution, the effects of executive share ownership on conditional stock options should be
neutral or positive.
More recent behavioral agency research (e.g., Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998) helps to untangle this complex web of incentive-risk bearing problems
associated with executive ownership and stock options. By combining agency arguments with
“prospect theory” research (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) these
authors suggest that executives’ risk preferences and decisions may be driven by “problem
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framing”, with their equity stakes being an important contingency affecting this framing. More
specifically, an executive’s current wealth may provide only a point of reference for assessing the
prospects as opposed to directly influencing the preference for risk (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998:134). These arguments may have particular relevance in the context of IPO firms.
            Even though there is a direct dilution of ownership at the time of the listing, founding and
non-founding executive directors usually retain a significant proportion of ownership at IPO
(Filatotchev, 2006). The lock-up restrictions on equity trading after the IPO may create transaction
costs that prevent executives to adjust their equity holdings to an optimal level (Beatty & Zajac,
1994). Therefore, the magnitude of the retained equity positions after the IPO may influence their
willingness to accept further risk bearing in their compensation contract. More specifically, using
locked-up executive equity as a reference point for framing problems as gain or loss, behavioral
models predict that executives should exhibit risk-averse preferences when considering the
appropriateness of different types of incentive schemes within “gain” context.  It seems likely that
members of an executive team see the IPO as a milestone of success and have high expectations
of the future (Arthurs et al., 2008; Certo et al., 2001; Certo et al., 2003).  Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia (1998) argue that this situation may shift executives’ preferences from risk-avoidance to
loss-avoidance, and they become more concerned with avoiding loss of perceived wealth than to
attracting additional wealth. This results in more conservative risk-averse posture. These
arguments imply that higher levels of retained executive equity after the IPO should frame their
risk preferences away from “tough” conditional share option schemes towards less riskier
unconditional schemes. Hence, we suggest:
Hypothesis 1: The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is negatively associated with the
level of retained ownership by the non-founding executive directors.
Previous studies of entrepreneurial IPOs recognize the continuing, albeit diminishing, centrality
of the founding team in the life of the threshold firm (Amit, Glosten & Muller, 1990; Certo et al.,
2001; Willard et al., 1992). Entrepreneurship research also indicates that the ability of the young
firm’s founders to formulate and implement strategic initiatives which capitalize on
environmental opportunities is vital to organizational growth and survival (Finkle, 1998;
Jayraman, Khorana & Nelling, 2000; Steier & Greenwood, 2000).  Founder characteristics,
therefore, such as motivation and incentives, have a direct impact on the firm’s development and
success in the long-run (Daily & Dalton, 1997).
However, as mentioned above, the IPO process is accompanied by significant shifts in the
distribution of ownership and control between founding and new shareholders that create
misalignment of incentives and a related set of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mello &
Parsons, 1998). As Pagano and Röell (1998:188) have pointed out, “in this situation the main
conflict of interest is that between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders,
rather than between hired managers and the generality of shareholders”. In addition, during the
process of “professionalization” of the firm before it comes to an IPO some founders may step
down from executive positions and move to non-executive roles (Willard et al., 1992), and this
arguably aligns their interests with interests of external, minority shareholders.
Therefore, entrepreneurial IPO firms provide a setting where multiple agency problems are
particularly salient (Arthurs et al., 2008). More specifically, the firm’s founders are, as a rule,
majority shareholders and, as principals, they should monitor executive directors (Sapienza &
Gupta, 1994; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). At the same time, they continue to serve in top
executive positions, including the CEO position. However, the process of “professionalization”
makes the founder cohort less homogeneous since some founders may have moved to non-
executive roles. Therefore, the multiple agency perspective should be augmented by considering
potential differences in governance roles of executive and non-executive founders, and this
research represents one of the first steps in this direction.
Behavioral agency arguments outlined above suggest that the framing of executive
attitudes towards conditional share option schemes depends on the amount of their wealth
associated with the IPO firm. It is the amount of perceived risk borne by the agents that affects
their willingness to accept “hard” conditions attached to incentives. Founding executives, in
addition to their financial wealth, also have a substantial amount of human capital invested in their
firm. Moreover, their long tenure since the firm’s inception to its IPO creates strong psychological
attachment to the firm, so its success and survival becomes a part of founder’s identity (Arthurs et
al., 2008). Therefore, from the behavioral agency perspective, founders’ human capital investment
and long tenure should be additional framing factors that re-enforce negative attitudes towards
additional risk associated with conditional share options.
On the other hand, non-executive founders may see themselves more as principals than
agents, especially when they retain a substantial equity stake in the firm after stepping down from
their executive roles. In a complex environment of IPO, although they still may be able to monitor
executives’ inputs, it is likely for them to have less idea about what the executives should spend
their time on (Prendergast, 2002). Since non-executive founders are likely to have withdrawn
from strategy-making process and other key executive decision, they have a reduced ability to
understand and evaluate executive decision compared to executive founders. In this case, the
framing of decisions of executive and non-executive founders should be different, and, in the
absence of an effective mechanism of monitoring and evaluating complex positions when the
optimal action is hard to pinpoint, non-executive founders are more likely to respond by offering
the executives a pay-for-performance contract (Prendergast, 2002). This incentive will be stronger
the higher is the non-executive founders’ wealth at stake.
            These arguments extend multiple agency research by suggesting that executive and non-
executive founders may have different risk attitudes and governance roles within the IPO firm,
with executive founders aligning their preferences with other executives, whereas non-executive
founders moving closer to the principal end of the spectrum. Hence, we suggest two linked
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is negatively associated with the
level of retained ownership by the executive founders.
Hypothesis 2b: The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is positively associated with the
level of retained ownership by the non- executive founders.
Apart from insiders, entrepreneurial IPOs very often have external block holders such as venture
capitalists. These investors provide equity finance at early stages of the venture’s life-cycle. As a
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result of this long-term involvement with the venture, VCs have increased incentives to monitor
both the decision plans and decision outcomes of managers (Brav & Gompers, 1997; Carpenter,
Pollock & Leary, 2003). In particular, VCs impose contractual restraints on managerial discretion,
including the use of staged investment, an enforceable nexus of security covenants, and the option
to replace the entrepreneur as manager unless key investment objectives are met (see Megginson
& Weiss, 1991, for a discussion).  Therefore, from the agency perspective, venture capitalists are
unique principals in the IPO firm with superior monitoring capacities that should compensate for
a relatively weak incentive alignment associated with non-conditional executive share options.
However, the multiple agency framework suggests a different picture of the governance
roles of VCs.  Although VCs are principals to a focal IPO firm they are also agents to those who
provide their investment funds (Arthurs et al., 2008). Despite the fact that VCs often use an IPO
as an “exit” opportunity, a substantial part of their equity holding still remains with the IPO firm
because of the lock-up arrangements that may last for over a year (Filatotchev, 2006). Therefore,
the pressure to show returns from their investment with their clientele may last way after the IPO
date, and this puts a serious burden on the monitoring capacity of VCs (Arthurs et al., 2008). As a
result, there may be a strong argument that VC’s retained ownership after an IPO may lead to an
increase in the probability of adopting performance related share options.
First, it is increasingly recognized in the management literature that IPO is an important
strategic stage in the life-cycle of entrepreneurial firms which is often referred to as the “re-birth”
or “re-start” of organizations (Finkle, 1998:6).  At this critical junction, a firm has overcome the
first challenges of its entrepreneurial phase and entered a growth stage. As Fama and
French (2004:229) emphasize, an IPO “is the point of entry that gives firms expanded access to
equity capital, allowing them to emerge and grow”. Prendergast (2002) argues that in this
complex strategic environment, it is difficult to write an input-based contract since there is no
clear understanding of what the agent should be doing; to provide such an incentive would
involve frequent and complex re-contracting. She suggests that “the purpose of offering
conditional pay schemes is not simply to induce effort, since an input based contracts could do
this, but to induce executives to carry out the right kinds of efforts” (p. 1091). Second, since VC’s
special rights associated with venture capital contract end at the time of an IPO, when the need for
oversight is particularly great, VC investors may compensate for a relative loss of control by
strengthening other governance mechanisms, such as increasing incentive alignment through
conditional share options (Black & Gilson, 1998). Finally, although behavioral agency theorists
did not explicitly study behavior of VCs, their arguments combined with the “multiple agency”
perspective on venture capitalists suggest that, because of the finite time horizons associated with
lock-up arrangements, VCs may shift their reference point towards encouraging executives’ risk
exposure by introducing conditional share option schemes.  These arguments are consistent with
empirical evidence related to more mature listed firms. For example, David, Kochhar & Levitas
(1998) found that the nature of ownership in U.S. firms was an important determinant of CEO
compensation. In particular their research supported the case that institutional investors (with only
an “investment relationship”) showed preferences towards lower overall levels of cash
compensation with an increase in the proportion of compensation received from long-term
incentives. Thus:
Hypothesis 3:  The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is positively associated with
presence of a retained ownership of venture capitalists after the IPO.
Board characteristics and equity based incentive schemes
In the previous section, we linked the type of executive share options schemes to the patterns of
ownership and control in the IPO firm. Using the multiple-agency framework we argued that there
may be a tension between the governance roles of executive and non-executive founders,
executive directors and venture capitalists in terms of defining “toughness” of executive incentive
schemes. Here we extend these arguments further by suggesting that compensation design may
also depend on board parameters of the IPO firm, since this decision is ultimately a prerogative of
the board and its committees. Therefore, board characteristics should have bearing on the “risk-
incentive” trade-off associated with executive share options.
From the agency perspective, in order to change managerial risk orientation and align their
interests with the interests of principals, firms not only need to set up incentive systems, but they
should also make sure that the board is actively involved in the critical functions of active
monitoring and evaluation of decisions made by the CEO and other top management team
members (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The effectiveness of these monitoring and control functions has
usually been related to the extent of board independence and has often been approximated by
structural factors such as the proportion of outsiders on the board, CEO/Chairman roles held
jointly or separately, etc. (Daily & Dalton, 1997; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Beatty and Zajac
(1994:317) suggest that a higher level of monitoring by boards would be required when
executives resist accepting compensation risks tied to firm performance. They stress that
traditional agency studies emphasize the primacy of incentive alignment in terms of dealing with
agency problems with monitoring being related to the magnitude of incentive gap. This line of
argument suggests that monitoring should be a substitute for lacking managerial incentives.
This view has been challenged by research on corporate governance as a system of
interdependent elements by exploring how governance practices interact and potentially
complement each other as related “bundles” of practices (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel &
Jackson, 2008; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh & Steward, 1990). Governance practices here are
not seen as being universally applicable.  Rather than isolated “best practices”, corporate
governance practices become effective only in particular combinations.  Complementarities
concern such interactions between practices, and how these interdependencies align governance to
potentially diverse organizational environments.  Therefore, monitoring may be complementary to
incentive systems associated with executive stock options.
These arguments may be particular relevant within the “multiple-agency” context, where
principal-agent dualities lead to different risk-incentive trade-offs among shareholder
constituencies of the IPO firm. Therefore, apart from controlling the executives’ actions and
evaluating their performance, monitoring in this context should also involve setting and
communicating performance standards to the executives. Behavior agency theorists argue that
these standards should be strongly related to the principal’s preferences. As Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia (1998) suggest “unambiguous communication of these standards results in clear
performance targets for the executive, which … should influence agent’s aspirations or reference
point for success” (p. 144). If boards are vigilant in their role of protecting interests of non-insider
shareholders then the standards they set should be higher than the standards set by the agent.
When this logic is applied within the “multiple-agency” context it becomes clear that the specific
board characteristics, such as board independence and founders’ control over board, may
determine the “salience” of principals’ preferences, and, therefore, they should have a significant
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impact on the choice of incentive schemes.
In the context of IPOs, executive directors are very often the original founders of the IPO
firm, and previous research suggests that the founder status of the CEO and/or Chairman may be
an important dimension of executive power within the organization that leads to an “executive
capture” of the board (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Ensley, Pearson & Amason, 2002). In previous
sections we argued that decision framing and risk preferences of founding and non-founding
executives are geared toward risk reduction associated with “soft” performance targets. As a
result, in the presence of founders’ control over the board and “executive capture”, performance
targets should be lower, reflecting the agent’s desire to establish accessible goals that reduce
employment risk and ensure contingent pay (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Hence,
Hypothesis 4: The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is negatively associated with
presence of founder-CEO/Chairman.
On the contrary, board independence may tip the balance away from the interest of insiders
towards protecting preferences of external shareholders and non-executive founders. Board
independence enhances the vigilance of monitoring (Daily, Johnson & Dalton, 1999; Golden &
Zajac, 2001; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Pfeffer, 1972; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Westphal,
1999), especially at those points in the life-cycle of the firm that involve strategic transition
(McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Socio-cognitive studies of corporate boards have extended agency
research by suggesting that pro-active behavior by independent directors may be also driven by
the strategic perspective and base of experience provided by their appointments to other
organizations (Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter & Westphal 2001; Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Zajac,
1995). Therefore, we may expect that independent directors will appreciate the importance of
conditional equity-based compensation schemes as it gradually becomes a “good governance”
standard in more mature listed firms. Board independence, therefore, should relate to the difficulty
of performance targets and, thus, to the executives’ reference point of success (Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Hence,
Hypothesis 5: The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is positively associated with the
level of board independence.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sample
The data sample used in this analysis comprises of a unique data set of founder-led initial public
offering companies in the UK.  The data have both been sourced from the London Stock
Exchange New Issues Listing and information from the Market Information and Analysis section
that hold historical fact sheets for all issues from 1998 (including companies issuing additional
shares, re-admissions and transfers between markets).  The data sample has been collected from
those companies floated on the London Stock Exchange (Main market and the Alternative
Investment Market (AIM)) over a five year period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2002.
For the given period, the London Stock Exchange lists show us that 872 companies were
floated as initial public offerings.  Any company with non UK incorporation was excluded as this
might be leading to different governance structures.  The IPO prospectuses for all remaining 766
UK companies were obtained from Thomson Research, which provides a comprehensive
coverage of company filings for publicly quoted UK companies.  Missing prospectuses were
obtained either via company web sites, or by telephone/written request to the companies or their
advisors whichever was deemed more appropriate.  Any company deciding upon UK flotation
must produce and file with the Stock Exchange a prospectus.  Each prospectus was examined and
particular emphasis given to the section detailing the history and founders of the company.  Any
companies that were unit or investment trust were excluded from the sample first (these have
particular governance characteristics), then those deemed to involve a de-merger, merger or
acquisition, corporate spin off, equity carve outs, reorganizations, or could be considered as solely
acquisition vehicles were also excluded (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002).  This resulted in 311
companies who clearly demonstrated that they had been developed via the entrepreneurial process
with entrepreneurial founders and those founders were serving as directors at the time of the
company’s flotation.  Since our focus is on the decision to adopt conditional versus non-
conditional share option schemes, we excluded a further 16 companies that did not have an
executive share option scheme at the time of IPO. Our final sample includes 295 companies. Their
listing prospectuses provide a wealth of information including details of the company’s financial
history, background details to the board of directors and their compensation contract, share
ownership and details of any equity based incentive schemes, thus enabling the data variables to
be collected from this document for each individual company.
Measures
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in this study is dichotomous and is measured as the presence of any
conditional equity based remuneration scheme (i.e. with specific performance criteria to be
achieved in order for grants to vest) at the point of IPO.  This information has been primarily
taken from the IPO prospectus that gives details of such schemes to future investors.  In order to
ensure accuracy, where details in the prospectus were vague, to prevent the possibility of missing
data or a wrong assumption, annual report and accounts following the IPO were checked with
reference to the scheme date in the IPO prospectus.
 Independent variables
Ownership of the company is stated in the prospectus in the section detailing ‘Directors’ and
Others’ Interests’ within the ‘Additional Information’ in the prospectus.  As a rule, the ownership
in this section is broken down into both the number of shares held by each director on the board
and the percentage of the total equity held by each individual member.  Details both prior to and at
the point of the IPO are given together in this one section.  Additional information as to whether
the shares are beneficial or non-beneficial and voting rights are also stipulated giving sufficient
information for exact ownership details to be calculated.  For this research, ownership details were
carefully collated for each individual director and the position on the board was noted (4
categories, CEO, Chair, Executive director, non-executive director).  A dichotomous variable was
also created to state whether the board member was a founder of the company or not.  By
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combining this information, the retained ownership variables were created for executive and non-
executive founder-directors and other, non-founder executives.
Later on in the same section of the document, block-holders (having greater than 3% share
ownership) are also cited, thus enabling the identification of venture capitalist involvement.
Attention was given to the section detailing any block investors in order to create a dummy
variable indicating whether the company had retained ownership by venture capitalist after the
IPO[1]. Names of the block-holders were identified and checked against the British Venture
Capital Association list of membership (British Venture Capital Association, 2003).
The extent of founders’ control over board was operationalized by collating information
relating to the position of the founders on the board of directors.   Founders were often in key
roles, e.g. as the CEO or Chair and on occasions these were held dually.  In order to measure this
a dummy variable “CEO/Chair Founder duality” was created.  This was assigned a value of one if
the role of the CEO and Chair was combined and held by a founder of the firm, and zero
otherwise.  Building on previous research, a continuous variable measuring the ratio of
independent (non-executive in the UK) directors to the total number of board members was used
to operationalize the extent of board structural independence (see Filatotchev, 2006, for an
extensive discussion).
Control Variables
Several control variables were used.  The sample of entrepreneurial IPO companies bridges a five
year period that covers a bullish peak in the market mid way and then a slower bear market.  As a
result of this market fluctuation, a dummy variable was created to indicate flotation before the
peak (April 2000).
To moderate for the method of issue and the market floated a further dummy variable was
created for those companies that floated via the placing method.  With a placing, shares are sold
directly to selected institutional investors.  Whilst this give the company more discretion to chose
its investors, it does result in a narrower shareholder base, which may have an effect on
involvement of block-holders (Pike & Neale, 2003).  Similarly companies floating on the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) were also identified by a coded dummy variable.
            Since the ex ante IPO’s risk is unobservable and multi-dimensional factor, we use a
number of proxies to operationalize it.  In line with previous research on IPO companies, the first
measurement for risk has been taken from the ‘risk factors’ discussed in the prospectus.  These
have simply been counted to provide a continuous measure for the risk of the firm, and a number
of studies consider this as an adequate proxy for the risks surrounding the firm (Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Certo et al., 2001; Cyr, Johnson & Welbourne, 2000).  A second measure for risk was
created against the strength of the present executive team, with particular reference to the founder
executives.  A dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether the loss of founder/key
personnel within the executive team was mentioned within the risk factors (1 = yes; 0 = no).  If so
this will be a particular risk to the further performance and direction of the company.
The third risk proxy measure is derived from the profitability (or un-profitability) of the firm as
disclosed to the future investors in the IPO prospectus.  Unfortunately due to the age of the many
of the firms a trend variable proved to be impractical.  So, in line with previous research, a
dichotomous measure was created (1= profitable, 0 = unprofitable) (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  The
fourth measure for risk was created, again against the (un)profitability of the firm.  This was an
expansion of the dichotomous measure above in that the variable was made ordinal over the four
year period prior to the IPO.  No trading, or a loss disclosed in any one year prior to the IPO was
given the value of 1.  Summing the values for each year gave a rank of 0 to 4.  Hence over the
four year period, companies with zero were determined as very low risk, as compared with
companies with a four, i.e. four years of either no trading or losses, which were assessed as very
high risk.
Since these proxies are not without weaknesses, we introduce an ex-post risk measurement of risk
using stock price volatility.  This was measured by taking the standard deviation of the first thirty
days trading prices for the shares.  Finally, we used a sectoral measurement of risk by creating a
‘high technology’ company dummy for firms from hi-tech industries such as information
technology, computers and software etc.
The age of the firm has been used to control for the sophistication of the firm as its
organizational structure and the development of governance systems may be linked to a life-cycle
development effect.  Previous research within mature companies shows that size might also be
seen as a determinant of the executive compensation contract (Conyon et al., 2000; Gregg et al.,
1993).  In order to control for the size of the IPO company, two variables were considered: the
market capital value of the firm at the point of the IPO and turnover in the year prior to the IPO.
Using market capital value at the time of the IPO to control for size has specific problems.  The
value placed on the share price might be influenced by the adoption of governance factors,
including the provision of equity based incentive schemes (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo, 2003;
Certo et al., 2003).  Indeed market capitalization may be under-valued as information
asymmetries between the various teams involved in the IPO process can lead to underpricing
(when the initial offer price is less than the first day close of trade price) (Certo et al., 2001;
Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Michaely & Shaw, 1994).  Alternatively, governance signals
(including retained ownership levels) may have a positive effect on the value of the firm (McBain
& Krause, 1989; Mikkelson et al., 1997).  With these factors in mind, the measure of market
capitalization as a control for the size of the organization might have considerable endogenous
and exogenous influences.  For this reason, sales turnover has been used to provide an adequate
control for the size of the firm.
As indicated in the theory section, the dilution of ownership can also influence adoption of
performance based incentives.  To control for this, dilution of the founders and other non founder
executive directors was measured as the percentage difference between the shares owned prior to
and at the point of the IPO.
Analytical Technique
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis makes the assumption that any linear model is
continuous, homoskedastic and normally distributed.  Thus with the dependent variable being the
presence of conditional equity incentive schemes within the compensation contract of the
executives, the use of OLS regression to model this data is inappropriate.  When the dependent
variable is of a dichotomous nature a more appropriate tool is multiple discriminant analysis or a
logistic regression model (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).  In most applications of this
nature the logit and probit models are quite similar, with the main difference being that the
logistic distribution has slightly flatter tails (Gujarati, 2003).    For comparison, both logit and
probit models have been run on the variables.  The results for both models were similar, with only
marginal differences in the levels of significances.  With such similar results, only those of the
one (logit) model have been reported.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix and for all variables used in
the study. From the sample of 295 companies, 49.2% of the executive share option schemes had
some form of performance criteria attached in order for shares only to vest to the executives if
these conditions are met (or exceeded).  Such a high number of companies operating schemes at
the IPO show the importance attached to these, both internally and externally.
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here
Table 1 also shows the founder directors were by far the predominant group of insider
shareholders, retaining above 30 percent of voting shares after the IPO on average. Founders in
executive roles represented largest block owners holding on average 27.74 percent of total shares.
Clearly, our data is consistent with the multiple-agency framework suggesting that founders could
be considered as agents and principles, depending on the context. Other non founder executives’
ownership was relatively low at 4.32 percent.  27 percent of IPOs in our sample had VC backing
at their IPO.
In terms of board structure, independent directors held 42 percent of board seats on
average.  However the inclusion of non executive founders who continue to have ownership
(mean 3 percent) might bring the levels of true independence into question.   A founder was the
firm’s CEO/Chair in over 80 percent of cases, indicating that founders had retained strong
leadership positions even at the IPO stage.
The results of the formal tests of our hypotheses are provided in Table 3. We introduced
the main explanatory variables in a step-wise fashion, and this helps to verify whether the main
regressors contributed to the explanatory power of the models used.
Insert Table 3 about here
As the models show, the riskier firms are less likely to have conditional share option
schemes, in line with the “risk-incentives trade-off” framework.  Large firms are more likely to
introduce conditional schemes, which, again, may be a reflection of their relatively lower level of
risk compared to smaller ventures.
As Model 1 shows, non-founding executive share ownership does not have any significant
effects on the probability of conditional schemes.  Although the non-founding executives do have
ownership in the company, the level of this (mean 4.34%) may be not enough to provide a
substitution effect with regards to incentive schemes.  Thus our hypothesis 1 is not supported.
The results in Model 2 provide a negative impact of the executive founders’ ownership
variable on the probability of conditional schemes, thus giving marginal support in line with
hypothesis 2a. However, contrary to hypothesis 2b, the retained ownership of non-executive
founders also has significantly negative effect. When we introduced a combined founders’
ownership in model 2, this variable had a strongly significant and negative effect. The level of
retained ownership by the founders (mean ownership of 31%) shows that they still effectively
control the firms, and their risk preferences are similar to non-founding executives.  It seems that,
regardless of the founders’ role in the firm, their retained ownership prevents introduction of
conditional share option schemes for executive directors, and we will return to this result in the
discussion.
As model 3 shows, VC-backed IPOs are more likely to have incentive pay schemes having
specific performance targets attached.  Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported. The presence of
venture capitalists positively enhances the governance of the firm, in line with our theoretical
predictions.
The founders not only have considerable power within the organization via their levels of
ownership; they also often retain powerful board positions.  Model 4 shows support for our
hypothesis 4, and the presence of conditional equity based incentive schemes in the remuneration
contracts of executive directors is negatively associated with founders’ board power/position,
even though following the IPO the ownership dynamics change. Finally, model 5 shows there is a
positive association between conditional incentive schemes and the levels of board independence.
However this is significant at the ten percent level, thus providing marginal support for our
hypothesis 5.  This does however reinforce the multiple agency effects and potential tension that
can happen within the board of such companies at the time of their IPO.
DISCUSSION
Bringing together behavioral agency theory and multiple-agency perspective has enabled a more
fine-grained study of the impact that ownership structure and board characteristics can have on the
governance of the company and, in particular, the use of equity based incentive schemes to tie
executives to performance and increasing shareholder return.  Our analysis suggests that, in the
context of IPO firms, the introduction of equity rewards tied directly to objective performance
measures is an outcome of the complex pattern of risk preferences and monitoring capacities of
different shareholder constituencies, including the original founders, hired executives and early
stage investors. The balance between these “conflicting voices”  (Hoskisson et al., 2002) in terms
of adopting incentive schemes also depends on board configurations, with “agent-centered”
boards leading to the introduction of “soft” share option schemes. This finding provide an
extension to the multiple agency research (e.g., Arthurs et al., 2008) by suggesting that
organizational outcomes of more than one agent group may also be linked to their influence over
the focal firm’s board.
The findings suggest that the founders of newly listed firms, regardless whether they are in
executive or non-executive roles, are still very much in control and resist executive equity rewards
being tied directly to objective performance measures.  More specifically, non-executive founders,
despite being large-block share holders, seem to collude with the executives when setting up
incentive schemes. Although multiple agency perspective would suggest that non-executive
founders’ interests should be aligned with those of external shareholders, such as VCs, as we
argued in a run-up to hypothesis 2b, our finding indicates that their governance role is different to
external large-block holders. This finding is quite important since it suggests a promising avenue
for future theory building within the context of agency research.
Multiple agency framework developed by Arthurs et al. (2008) does not account for
possible differences in monitoring abilities and risk preferences of principals in an IPO, although
from behavioral agency perspective there may be compelling reasons to argue that founders’
framing or risk-related decisions may differ from external shareholders. First, despite possible
dilution of their ownership, non-executive founders still have their human and financial capital
associated with the focal firm, and, therefore, they are not risk neutral as diversified external
shareholders. From the behavioral agency theory point of view, this should frame their risk
preferences away from extensive risk-taking associated with business strategies driven by
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conditional executive share options. Second, non-executive founders may still be closely involved
with the firm which they have set up in the past and helped to develop. As a principal, they may
have a good idea of what the executives should be doing after flotation, so that by observing
efforts they can be sure that private and social benefits are aligned (Prendergast, 2002). Again,
this diminishes the importance of output-based incentive contracts for the executives bearing in
mind their potential costs for the firm. Our empirical finding suggests that an integration of
research on risk-incentive trade-offs and behavioral agency perspective with multiple agency
theory may enrich our understanding of complex governance issues in the “threshold”, IPO firms.
Our analysis also suggests that the founders are still able to exercise strong board
leadership including the influence of incentive strategies.  Tied with the power of the Founder-
CEO/Chair, firms are maintaining a “founder-centric” structure, and founders have sufficient
power to negotiate governance arrangements that are positively preserving their influence and
rewarding their length of service rather than performance by the nature of incentive grants being
unconditional.  However, we did not find some evidence of the “good governance” roles of
independent directors, although our results are only weakly significant. This brings into question
the selection processes for these directors, as well as the extent of their independence from the
founding directors in the context of IPOs.
However, it is not totally a founder “self governing” picture that emerges from our
analysis.  Entrepreneurial firms that come to an IPO often have significant equity stakes held by
early stage investors, such as venture capitalists. Previous studies on the governance roles of VCs
are rather ambiguous in terms of their impact on incentive and monitoring systems during and
after the IPO. Most of researchers emphasize “exit-oriented” nature of VC investment, that may
undermine their willingness and ability effectively participate in governance of new issues (Black
& Gilson, 1998). Our findings clearly show that this may not be a universal case, especially when
VCs continue to own shares after the IPO. Using behavioral and multiple agency frameworks we
argued that venture capital firm is a special case of block-holders who appears to be actively
involved in the governance development process. However, the emphasis of this involvement may
shift from the direct monitoring to more active use of performance-related incentives after the
IPO. Within this context, it is no surprise to see a positive association between VC involvement
after the IPO and the presence of conditional equity based incentive schemes.
Previous research has recognized that governance mechanisms operate interdependently
with the overall effectiveness depending on a simultaneous operation of several mechanisms in
limiting managerial opportunism (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh & Steward, 1990). Different
governance mechanisms can complement each other (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson,
2007; Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 2003), and the cost-benefit trade-offs among a variety
of governance mechanisms would determine their use (Rediker & Seth, 1995:88). We extend this
research further and make two contributions.  First, we suggest that a substitution hypothesis
associated with incentives/monitoring functions of corporate governance suggested by traditional
agency perspective provides a simplified picture that does not take into account behavioral aspects
of different constituencies within the multiple agency framework. Our arguments and empirical
findings are in line with complementarity hypothesis (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003) that seems to have
relevance not only within the context of mature firms with diffused share ownership, but it plays a
very important role in terms of mitigating conflicts between founders and shareholders in the IPO
firm. Second, we analyze links between “toughness” of executive compensation and general
governance factors in “threshold” firms, and this area was largely overlooked by agency research.
With clear changes to the pay strategies happening at the point of IPO, there is the
potential for further research in this area.  The commanding position of the founders leads to
unconditional incentive rewards. However, research shows that founders do depart companies
(either willingly or unwillingly).  Once this happens governance strategies again might be
changed.  There is also the point that the majority of the schemes implemented follow a three-year
cycle from granting to vesting.  One cannot ignore the possibility that grants are unconditional as
their implementation has been no more than an “experimental” view of this type of incentive
scheme.  Further research based on a longitudinal study of post-IPO dynamics could provide
insight into the changes and development of such schemes.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper’s findings indicate that corporate governance is not an exogenous mechanism that
solely provides checks and controls over the efficiency with which companies are run and whether
managers make decisions in the interests of shareholders. More specifically, executive incentive
schemes are closely related to the distribution of ownership and board power among founding and
independent board members; insiders and external blockholders. The next step would be to link
different governance configurations with organizational outcomes, and previous research provides
evidence of possible effects of the IPO governance characteristics on the level of
internationalization (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003) and performance (Arthurs et al., 2008; Certo et
al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Although it is beyond the ambitions of this paper to
specify and test empirically complex linkages between ownership dynamics, incentive schemes
and IPO performance, it helps to map out future broad areas and questions for empirical enquiry
guided by a processual and behavioral analysis of executive compensation.
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TABLE 1.
Means, Median Values and Standard Deviations
|Variables                                   |Mean     |Median or|S.D.      |
|                                            |         |% a      |          |
|Dependent Variable                          |         |         |          |
|   |At IPO presence of any conditional share|         |49.2     |          |
|   |option scheme                           |         |         |          |
|Independent Variables                       |         |         |          |
|   |Non founder executives’ ownership (%)   |4.32     |1.17     |7.19      |
|   |Executive founders’ ownership (%)       |27.74    |23.60    |21.61     |
|   |Non executive founders’ ownership (%)   |3.14     |0.00     |10.67     |
|   |VC backed company                       |         |27.00    |          |
|   |CEO/Chair founder                       |         |86.78    |          |
|   |Board Independence                      |41.93    |40.00    |14.04     |
|Control Variables                           |         |         |          |
|   |Annual Turnover (£,000)                 |22128    |2719     |90703     |
|   |Age of Company                          |6.48     |5.00     |6.44      |
|   |No risk factors                         |11.96    |10.00    |7.43      |
|   |Departure of key personnel              |         |70.34    |          |
|   |(Un)Profitability risk                  |         |61.00    |          |
|   |Previous trading/(un)profitability      |         |2.59     |          |
|   |Share price volatility                  |47.70    |7.01     |299.03    |
|   |Float date pre dot com bubble           |         |30.51    |          |
|   |Technology company                      |         |29.00    |          |
|   |Founders’ dilution (%)                  |13.12    |10.41    |14.57     |
|   |Executives’ dilution (%)                |2.40     |0.36     |6.53      |
|   |Placing method                          |         |84.00    |          |
|   |Aim floatation                          |         |71.00    |          |
|a Percentages are reported for the 0/1 variables.                          |
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TABLE 2
Correlation matrix for all variables
|Variable                                                                                                |1       |
TABLE 2 (continued)
|Variable                                                                                                         |
TABLE 3
Logistic Regression Results
|Dependent Variable              |Conditional   |Conditional |Conditional  |Conditional  |Conditional  |
|                                |scheme        |scheme      |scheme       |scheme       |scheme       |
|                                |Logit         |Logit       |Logit        |Logit        |Logit        |
|                                |Model 1       |Model 2     |Model 3      |Model 4      |Model 5      |
|Constant                        |-2.027        |-1.506      |-1.789       |-.973        |-1.908       |
|Non-founder executives’         |.002          |.001        |.008         |.003         |.010         |
|ownership                       |              |            |             |             |             |
|Executive founders’ ownership   |              |-.010 †     |-.007 †      |-.001 †      |-.003 †      |
|Non-executive founders’         |              |-.060 *     |-.063 *      |-.068 *      |-.070 *      |
|ownership                       |              |            |             |             |             |
|VC backing                      |              |            |.650 **      |.670 **      |.689 *       |
|CEO/Chair founder               |              |            |             |-.995 **     |-.993 **     |
|Board independence              |              |            |             |             |1.532 †      |
|Controls                        |              |            |             |             |             |
|Log turnover yr-1 (£,000)       |.456 *        |.513 *      |.504 *       |.571 **      |.594 **      |
|Age of company                  |.055 †        |.052 †      |.056 †       |.043         |.041         |
|Number of  risk factors         |-.024 †       |-.021 †     |-.020 †      |-.026 †      |-.030 †      |
|Departure of key personnel      |-.216 †       |-.030 †     |-.085 †      |-.162 †      |-.183 †      |
|(Un)profitability               |-.511         |-.696       |-.634        |-.680        |-.666        |
|Previous trading/               |.427 *        |.422 *      |.407 *       |.398 *       |.422 *       |
|(un)profitability               |              |            |             |             |             |
|Share price volatility          |.000          |.000        |.000         |-.001        |-.001        |
|Float time dot.com bubble       |.006          |.065        |.071         |.059         |.075         |
|Technology company              |.132          |.055        |.001         |.028         |.041         |
|Founders’ dilution              |-.011         |-.009       |-.009        |-.006        |-.007        |
|Executives’ dilution            |.044          |.036        |.037         |.044         |.049         |
|Placing method                  |.112          |.266        |.340         |.405         |.355         |
|AIM floatation                  |-.364         |-.207       |-.076        |-.164        |-.093        |
|% correct predictions           |63.9          |64.5        | 64.9        |67.3         |67.9         |
|Nagelkerke R2                   |.130          |.174        |.193         |21.5         |22.4         |
|Model ( 2 value                 |17.28         |23.63 †     |26.14 †      |29.40 *      |30.81 *      |
|† p(0.10;  * p(0.05;  ** p(0.01, *** p(0.001                                                           |
-------------------------------------------
[1] We also used a continuous variable related to the retained ownership stake by VCs. This
variable produced similar results, but the overall explanatory power of the regression model was
lower, so we do not report these results here.
